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A Revised Monitoring Model Confronts
Today’s Movement Toward Managerialism
James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas*
There are many lessons to be drawn from the sweep of history. In law, the
compelling story repeatedly told is the observable co-movement of law on the
one hand, and economic, social, and political changes on the other hand.1
Aberrations, however, do arise but generally do not persist in the long term.
Contemporary corporate law seems to be on the cusp of such an abnormality as
legal developments and proposed reforms for corporate law are currently
conflicting with the direction in which the host environment is moving. This
article identifies a series of contemporary judicial and regulatory corporate
governance developments that are at odds with multiple forces unleashed by
today’s ownership of public companies being highly concentrated in the hands
of various types of financial institutions. In particular, we focus on the
appropriateness of recent regulatory impediments that have been placed in the
path of the continuing evolution of the monitoring board of directors but with an
eye to the past, as well as how developments over the last several decades
complete the central feature of modern corporate governance, the monitoring
model.
To address this question, we begin by travelling back in time to post-World
War II America during the dominance of managerialism, when shareholders
were analogous to children—seen but not heard. That model was replaced by
today’s monitoring model, which empowers oversight of management in the
hands of outside directors, whose obeisance, at least on paper, is anchored in
the firm’s residual claimants, the stockholders who elect the directors. But, as
we discuss, the monitoring board has something of a checkered history in serving
this function. We argue that from its inception the monitoring board was
incomplete and board-centric because it was formed in an era where the received
model was dispersed, not concentrated, ownership. That, of course, is no longer
what characterizes American public companies. Today we believe that the
* The authors would like to thank Professors John Coates, Melvin Eisenberg, Robert
Thompson, Harwell Wells, and Vice Chancellor Joseph Slights, as well as Ted Mirvis, and the
participants at the Texas Law Review’s conference, “Governance Wars,” and Monash University’s
Law and Business Seminar Series, for their helpful comments.
1. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–
1960 (1992) (comparing the evolution of the common law to economic growth in the U.S). Oliver
Wendell Holmes gained much of his stature by being in the vanguard as one who recognized that
the law was not simply found in a set of abstract principles received from on high but was rather
molded by on-the-ground practical considerations, shaped by interacting social, political, and
economic forces. See, e.g., Bradley C.S. Watson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and the Natural Law,
NAT. LAW, NAT. RIGHTS, AND AM. CONSTITUTIONALISM (2011), http://www.nlnrac.org/critics/
oliver-wendell-holmes [https://perma.cc/2JWU-JXRK].
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growth of institutional investors’ voting power and the engagement of hedge fund
activists have repeatedly demonstrated ways to strengthen the monitoring board
and in practice remedied many of its weaknesses.2 We argue that this natural
progression has been disrupted by recent regulatory actions aimed at weakening
the shareholders’ voice.
We next challenge the emerging New Paradigm and its accompanying
appeals to stakeholder primacy that are being advanced as the future models for
corporate governance. We conclude the article with a short set of
recommendations we believe will bolster the heretofore incomplete and boardcentric monitoring model for corporate governance.

I.

Managerialism—The Quiet Life of the CEO
Corporate governance is a broad term.3 Today there are two schools of
thought about what constitutes good corporate governance: the shareholder
perspective4 and the stakeholder model.5 In this section, we focus on
managerialism6 and the stakeholder model. We trace the rise of their
importance during the 1950s and ’60s and their decline during the 1970s and
’80s. We also show how managerialism’s fortunes moved in tandem with
those of the stakeholder model.
In the post-World War II period, managerialism was the dominant form
of governance. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, American public
2. See infra text accompanying notes 54–85 (reviewing empirical studies and case study of
effects of activist hedge funds). This Article addresses a critique of the monitoring model leveled
thirty years ago, “who will monitor the monitors[?]” Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863,
873–74 (1991) (recommending that to enhance the monitoring model, financial institutions be
empowered to appoint directors chosen from a cadre of professional directors).
3. The term corporate governance refers to the interplay between actors with direct and indirect
interests in a corporation, including management, the board of directors, shareholders, employees,
creditors, suppliers, customers, local communities, government, and the general public. Brian R.
Cheffins, Corporate Governance Since the Managerial Capitalism Era, 89 BUS. HIST. REV. 717,
717 (2015); Steve Letza, Xiuping Sun & James Kirkbride, Shareholding Versus Stakeholding: A
Critical Review of Corporate Governance, 12 CORP. GOVERNANCE 242, 242 (2004).
4. The shareholder perspective views the corporation as a legal instrument for shareholders to
maximize their investment returns and focuses on the checks and balances between shareholders,
the board of directors, and executive managers to secure the shareholders’ interests. Letza et al.,
supra note 3, at 243.
5. The stakeholder perspective views the corporation as an entity serving the interests of a larger
group of actors—including employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and local communities. Id.
6. The historical reference point for our use of the expression “managerialism” is the era
immediately after World War II, when, as we describe below, managers pursued the interests of the
corporation not with the single focus of shareholders but by mediating the owners’ interests along
with those of other stakeholders. This era and the mission pursued by corporate executives are richly
developed in Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change,
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305,
310 (2013), which used the expression “heroic managerialism” to give emphasis to the executives
according non-shareholder interests great weight in their pursuit of profits.
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corporations were largely run by unfettered CEOs purportedly for the benefit
of their stakeholders. Stockholders were dispersed, weak, and, with few
exceptions, universally ignored. Corporate directors were underlings or
friends of the CEO and often rubberstamped whatever the CEO told them to
approve. The American economy was booming as many of the other nations
in the world were still struggling to rebuild in the aftermath of the war.
The seeds of managerialism were sown earlier. In the midst of the Great
Depression, Berle and Means captured the nation’s attention by bringing to
light the ills of the modern public corporation, in which not only was
ownership separated from management, but more importantly, management
hired capital, not the other way around as most assumed. They were also
prescient because they foretold the rise of stakeholder capitalism and
managerial domination.7 In their view, the nation’s largest corporations
would come to dominate American society to such an extent that the “larger
interests of society” would have a claim on their wealth “at least equal to that
of shareholders.”8 At the helm, managers would be responsible for the
monumental task of “balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the
community and assigning each a portion of the income stream on the basis of
public policy rather than private cupidity.”9 Corporations were to become the
modern city–state as managers served a broad group of constituencies.
Power, of course, was needed to discharge such a heavy responsibility.
Hence, power accreted naturally to executives to enable officers to mediate
among the divergent interests of various stakeholders in the firm. At the same
time, throughout the ’50s and ’60s, corporate boards were dominated by
inside directors, friends of the CEO, and outsiders with deep commercial
relationships with the company, such as its investment bankers or lawyers,
and thus they were not independent of management. And, under the
stakeholder model, boards were not focused exclusively on increasing
shareholder value, seeing this as just one of many objectives managers were
to pursue within the broader mission of balancing the sometimes competing
interests of the firm’s many stakeholders.10 Thus, the stakeholder model

7. See Wells, supra note 6, at 314 (describing Berle and Means’ work as “foundational” to
“modern corporate law scholarship”). See generally James J. Park, From Managers to Markets:
Valuation and the Shareholder Wealth Paradigm, 7–18 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 20–09, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3731764 [https://perma.cc/5SQC-Y6XY]
(reviewing the rise and fall of managerialism).
8. Wells, supra note 6, at 322 (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1933)).
9. Wells, supra note 6, at 314 (quoting BERLE, supra note 8).
10. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 6, at 322 (highlighting the prevailing thought in the 1950s and
well into the ’60s that corporations were something of an inanimate statesman, speaking for
capitalism by pursuing social objectives beyond wealth maximization).
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required and got what it needed: a dominant CEO and a docile board of
directors.11
Directors were weak for several reasons. Professor Myles Mace of
Harvard Business School, in his widely cited survey of practices within
boardrooms of American public companies, concluded there was a serious
misalignment between popular conceptions of boards and what they actually
did.12 Mace noted that by the nature of their role, directors regrettably did not
devote substantial time to the affairs of the companies they serve.13 Even
though the handful of outside directors occasionally did provide useful advice
and counsel when their specialized backgrounds, e.g., finance, were
implicated in the affairs of the company, boards had too heavy a
representation from subordinates to the CEO to be considered independent.14
And while boards were sometimes tasked to replace an incapacitated CEO,
only rarely did they ask one to resign.15 Indeed, the few incidents reported
involving an attempt to force an underperforming or incompetent CEO to
step down required a combination of inside and outside directors to act
without the CEO knowing; the rarity of such instances was attributed to the
attendant risk of punishment for acts treated akin to treason if the ouster
failed.16
The centralization of managerial power came largely at the expense of
shareholders.17 According to the popular book American Business Creed, the
rise of the stakeholder perspective meant that shareholders were now “on a
par with other groups who have stakes in, and just claims on, the
organization.”18 Fortune magazine stated in 1951 that the shareholder “has
become a kind of contingent bondholder rather than a part owner, [one] who
rarely exerts any direct influence on the affairs of the company.”19 Not only
had the aim of the corporation shifted away from maximum profitmaking,
but shareholders’ influence on the direction of the corporation had become
11. See Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950–2000: Major Changes
but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 352 (2000) (relating anecdotes of CEOs’ dominance
over directors in the 1950s); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 179–94 (1971)
(noting that the role of directors was largely advisory rather than of a decision-making nature);
RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 94–96
(1976) (summarizing views on board impotence).
12. MACE, supra note 11, at 2.
13. Id. at 179.
14. Id. at 179–80.
15. See Hamilton, supra note 11, at 351 (“About the only situation in which the board . . .
selected a new CEO was . . . serious illness or unexpected death . . . .”).
16. See id. (comparing CEO removal to a “palace coup”).
17. Wells, supra note 6, at 328.
18. FRANCIS X. SUTTON, SEYMOUR E. HARRIS, CARL KAYSEN & JAMES TOBIN, THE
AMERICAN BUSINESS CREED 58 (1956).
19. Wells, supra note 6, at 328 (quoting THE EDITORS OF FORTUNE MAGAZINE, U.S.A. THE
PERMANENT REVOLUTION 68 (1951).
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minimal. According to Professor Robert Hamilton, Berle and Means’
description of the impact of the separation of ownership and control had
continued salience in the 1950s.20 Retail investors lacked both the appetite
and aptitude to intervene in corporate affairs and did not own more than a
tiny fraction of the company’s stock.21 Consequently, the shareholder
democracy movement was small and faced “astounding obstacles.”22 Any
possibility that an outside group could successfully solicit proxies in
opposition to management was remote.23 Hence, the typical pathway for
shareholders to convey their dissatisfaction with the management of
corporate decision-making was to follow the “Wall Street Rule”: sell shares
in the market rather than attempt to vote or sue to effect change in the
corporation.24
The weaknesses of the managerialist governance model for the public
firm manifested beginning in the 1970s with poor performance by American
companies in the face of rising global competition from industrial powers in
once war-torn countries, inherent inefficiencies of the conglomerate form of
business organization that pervaded many sectors of American industry,25
and the high-profile bribery scandals uncovered in the wake of Watergate.26
Thus, by at least the late 1980s, managerialism had been mostly replaced by
a monitoring model anchored in a focus on shareholder wealth
maximization.27
Additionally, before that, the stakeholder model had come under
pressure from shareholder friendly hostile takeovers. The omnipresent threat
of a takeover bid incentivized managers to focus on shareholder returns and

20. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 350.
21. Cheffins, supra note 3, at 720; Hamilton, supra note 11, at 350.
22. DANIEL JAY BAUM & NED B. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
AND CORPORATE CONTROL 14–17 (Authors Guild Backinprint.com ed. 2007) (1965).
23. See NADER, supra note 11, at 89–90 (outlining state law obstacles to effective exercise of
shareholder democracy).
24. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 350.
25. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 444 (2001) (explaining that the collapse of conglomerate strategy in the 1970s and into the
1980s “largely destroyed the normative appeal of the managerialist model”).
26. Cheffins, supra note 3, at 725–26. Through the Watergate Scandal beginning in 1972, the
Special Prosecutor’s Office not only unearthed political impropriety, but also corporate impropriety.
Id. These revelations transformed the public image of corporations. Having once viewed
corporations as generally law-abiding corporate citizens, the public now viewed corporations as
criminal enterprises, and feared corporate misdeeds. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 359. As a result,
corporate governance reforms that granted the board of directors additional monitoring power were
put on the official agenda. Id. at 359–60; Cheffins, supra note 3, at 726. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and
Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1478 (2007) (referring to the above events as evidence
of a “governance crisis” that ushered in reform efforts through the monitoring model).
27. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1469. Gordon places this shift as concluding in the 1990s, but like
any historical change, the movement most certainly began earlier.
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acted as an external corporate governance mechanism.28 Moreover, as we
discuss more fully in the next section, the growth of institutional investors—
organizations that hold large portfolios of securities under professional
management—had a significant impact on shifting the balance of corporate
power back towards shareholders.29 This all spawned calls for reform that
ultimately gave rise to the monitoring model.
II.

The Rise of the Monitoring Model
The monitoring model is premised on the belief that independent
directors can act as robust monitors of corporate management in order to
improve corporate performance and take extraordinary action to curb internal
abuses in crucial situations by, among other things, terminating ineffective
corporate management.30 Beginning in the 1970s, a pronounced shift in
thinking regarding the mission of the firm occurred, resulting in more and
more public companies increasing the percentage of independent directors on
their board. The monitoring model meant great emphasis was placed on
defining relationships and processes of appointment which disqualified an
individual from being independent while reducing the substantive content of
fiduciary obligations.31 Whereas before the monitoring model, self-dealing
acquisitions were addressed through a broad inquiry into the overall financial
fairness of the transaction, under the influence of the monitoring model, the
inquiry shifted so that the focus was heavily anchored on the process whereby
an independent body of directors approved the transaction.32 This emphasis

28. Cheffins, supra note 3, at 729–30. Before the era of the hostile takeovers, a wave of
management-going-private transactions could also be seen as indicative failings of managerialism
as insiders exploited their firm’s undervaluation by taking the firms private and changing operations
to improve returns for the manager-owners.
29. Hamilton, supra note 11, at 353.
30. This widely adhered to view is carefully developed by Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg. See
generally MELVIN A. EISENBERG, Who Manages the Business of a Corporation?, in THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 139 (1976) (closely analyzing alternative
board structures and concluding the monitoring model holds the best opportunity for boards to
achieve what they are capable of achieving).
31. Masulis conducted a recent review of the literature on boards of directors with a focus on
the value of independent directors. See Ronald W. Masulis, A Survey of Recent Evidence on Boards
of Directors and CEO Incentives, 49 ASIA-PAC. J. FIN. STUD. 7, 19 (2020) (finding, among other
things, that evidence suggests “board independence leads to greater sensitivity of forced CEO
turnover to performance”).
32. The overriding role that independent director approval plays in such transactions supports
the view that the monitoring model exists, at least in part, to insulate transactions from close judicial
scrutiny. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 17, 41 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010) (arguing the monitoring model
was developed primarily to insulate directors and managers from liability).
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was soon extended beyond self-dealing transactions33 and became the
medium to address the corporation’s interest served by an on-going
derivative suit.34 In these extensions, there was emphasis on the financial
independence of the deciding directors as well as the steps they took to reach
a decision.
The monitoring model also impacts how directors interact with one
another. With the emphasis on process, the time demands on outsiders to
meet this new standard increased with the result being that directors’ roles
within governance morphed into their being more specialists than generalists
in monitoring management’s overall stewardship. Today, the directors’
monitoring role is bifurcated through tasks assigned to three or more board
subcommittees so there is a threat this may balkanize oversight.
Empirical evidence on the benefits associated with the independent
directors in fulfilling the objectives of the monitoring model is mixed. Studies
of various financial performance measurements do not make a compelling
case that the degree of board independence is associated with significant
financial performance.35 The clearest indication of director independence
exists in studies examining whether increases in the degree of board
independence impacts CEO tenure. In considering this connection, it is useful
to divide the inquiry into three distinct corporate governance periods. First,
there was a noticeable relationship between the percentage of outside
directors and CEO turnover during the halcyon days of the 1970s when
companies moved quickly to have a core group of outside directors.36 The
second era is the 1980s when hostile takeovers were center stage as a
mechanism for addressing managerial “slack”; during this period, there was
an observable relationship between the percentage of inside directors and
CEO turnover, but it is not as pronounced as when boards were just evolving
to being largely outsiders.37 In the third, contemporary era, with the
33. See, e.g., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (conditioning the
presumption of fairness of self-dealing acquisition on there being an independent negotiating
committee as well as fully informed non-coerced approval by independent shareholders).
34. See, e.g., C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, How Do Legal
Standards Matter? An Empirical Study of Special Litigation Committees, 60 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2
(2020) (reviewing dismissal rates to conclude that judicial review of procedures followed by
committees has significant impact on outcomes).
35. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: The Sequel,
58 J. CORP. FIN. 142, 142–43 (2019).
36. See, e.g., Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON.
(THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG CORPORATE MANAGERS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND
DIRECTORS) 431, 447 (1987) (finding in a study of NYSE firms between 1974–1983 that
underperforming firms with outsider dominated boards were more likely to replace their CEOs; the
results were found not impacted by ownership structure, size, or industry considerations).
37. See Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary
Managerial Turnover, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 221 (1997) (finding that percentage of independent
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prevalence of boards being heavily comprised of outside directors, slight
differences in the percentage of outside directors were not observed to have
a significant impact on CEO tenure.38
The impact of outside directors on CEO compensation is less clear than
in the case of CEO tenure. Indeed, the growing percentage of boards being
made up of outside directors appears to have negligible impact on executive
compensation. In addition to the clubiness of the boardroom,39 there is
evidence of other biasing forces, such as the directors’ compensation itself40
or even that the corporation makes charitable contributions to charities in
which directors are affiliated.41
However, stronger linkages of pay and performance have been observed
when the board has an independent director who is a blockholder (IDB);
when this exists, there is lower excess pay for CEOs and lower proportions
of equity-based pay.42 Agrawal and Nasser’s findings suggest that IDB
presence is systemically connected to corporate governance and reveal that
CEOs of firms with IDBs have lower excess pay and lower equitycompensation.43 The authors posit that their results lend support to the
monitoring model over the private-benefits model.44 Their data also support
our belief that independent directors are a good solution to issues in corporate
governance, but they too need incentives to monitor management in the best
interest of the shareholders.45

directors was not a significant variable in CEO turnover in both the active-takeover era between
1984–1988 or low-takeover era between 1989–1993). Interestingly, the authors find that CEO
turnover has no statistical relationship to performance in the low-takeover era. Id. at 206.
38. See Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J.
CORP. FIN. 257, 270 (2008) (finding firms with a larger percent of independent directors were more
likely to respond to poor performance by terminating the CEO); Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani,
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?, 61 J. FIN. 689, 691 (2006) (finding that CEO turnover is more
sensitive to poor performance when independent directors comprise a majority of the board). But
see Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 35, at 146 n.10 (supporting the view that director independence
became such an overarching concern after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 that
incremental increases in percentage of outside directors were no longer significant variables in the
tenure of CEOs).
39. EISENBERG, supra note 30, at 171.
40. David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors,
59 J. FIN. 2281, 2281 (2004).
41. Ye Cai, Jin Xu & Jun Yang, Paying by Donating: Corporate Donations Affiliated with
Independent Directors, 34 REV. FIN. STUD. 618, 655 (2021).
42. Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation,
Turnover and Firm Valuation, 9 Q.J. FIN., Mar. 2019, at 1950010–1, 1950010–5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1950010-43.
45. Liu and her coauthors find that institutional investor monitoring creates important director
incentives to monitor, but distracted institutional investors weaken board oversight. Claire Liu,
Angie Low, Ronald W. Masulis & Le Zhang, Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional
Investors and Board Governance, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 4489, 4525 (2020).
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We believe the uneven to non-observable benefits associated with
independent boards reflect the fact that the monitoring model, initially
received as board-centric, was incomplete. At the time the monitoring model
was initially embraced, stock ownership was highly dispersed so that
stockholders were not an organized force; hence, the monitoring model was
distinctly board-centric. Such a preoccupation with the board is ripe for
reexamination now, both because financial institutions currently hold 70% of
the shares of publicly traded companies and because there is a rich history of
activist institutional investors.46 We believe both of these developments can
enhance the monitoring model. However, because the rise of institutional
investors followed the conceptualization and adoption of the monitoring
model, a role for the investors as an active part of monitoring was not
incorporated into the model.
Institutional activism began in the 1990s and has since accelerated,47
focusing on governance proposals that held strong intuitive appeal regarding
strengthening board independence—annual elections, needing majority
support of the shareholders, direct shareholder nominations of director
candidates, and independence in the board’s agenda by selecting a chair that
was a monitor—not the monitored.48 Support across a constellation of
institutional shareholders on such general governance positions posed no
insurmountable collective action concerns. On the other hand, time
constraints and financial burdens for most institutional investors to determine
how a company held in its portfolio could materially improve its performance
led to them being “rationally reticent” while being eager to receive proposals
to improve the performance of a portfolio company.49
These problems created their own solution; proxy voting advisors
sprang up to assist the institutions in deciding how to vote their shares in
hundreds of companies.50 Proxy advisors were also retained to perform a
variety of other services, such as keeping track of proxy cut-off times,
examining proxy materials, and promulgating vote recommendations.51 Yet,
46. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-47, CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS:
PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 13 (2016).
47. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
48. See generally Keith L. Johnson, Rebuilding Corporate Boards and Refocusing Shareholders
for the Post-Enron Era, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 787 (2002) (describing how shareholders can
preserve and enhance the company by focusing on director value).
49. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 47, at 867 (noting that many institutional investors are
constrained by conflicts of interest, as well as resources, to be activists, so they are reticent to
initiate; however, they nonetheless devote resources they have to considering well-crafted proposals
by hedge funds and others who are neither reticent nor constrained).
50. Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, Exchange Act
Release No. 34–87457, 2019 WL 5869793 at *7–8 (proposed Nov. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 240).
51. Id. at *8.
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even the advent of this new service did not fully resolve many of the
corporate governance problems facing institutional investors. The
deficiencies of the monitoring model—part-time directors with limited
access to information, a director nomination process dominated by
management, and directors with limited financial incentives in taking action
to improve corporate value—persisted. This void set the stage for
institutional-shareholder activism that became a force for urging independent
directors to take action in ways the activists argued were better aligned with
the interests of shareholders; this development bolstered the monitoring
model and has enabled it to become a more vibrant part of contemporary
corporate governance.52 But, there was still much more that needed to be
done.
The activist hedge funds entered this fertile ground as “governance
intermediaries.”53 This occurred as hedge fund activists provided boards with
alternative business strategies backed up with investment banker analyses,
top-flight management consultants, and alternative flows of information to
those provided by corporate management. The appearance of an activist
hedge fund with a strong track record in prior engagements generated clear
short-run performance improvements and perhaps, but more controversially,
long-run gains too.54 These developments demonstratively stiffened the spine
of directors by leading to significant operational changes in the wake of
shareholder concentration and support our view that, as initially adopted, the

52. In a fascinating study of one large U.K. institutional investor, Becht and his co-authors,
found that this particular institution engaged with all of its portfolio companies at least once a year,
and its dedicated Governance and Stewardship Group had 564 direct contacts with portfolio firms
in 2015. Marco Becht, Julian Franks & Hannes F. Wagner, Corporate Governance Through Voice
and Exit 11 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 633/2019, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456626
[https://perma.cc/3JMV-RTEP].
They also found that hedge fund activist proposals received “special treatment,” resulting in extra
scrutiny. Id. at 63.
53. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 47, at 867 (“[R]econcentration of ownership through
institutions adds only marginally to the value of the vote . . . . [T]he activist shareholder . . .
increase[s] the value of the vote held by the institutions by teeing up the intervention choices at low
cost to the institutional owners.”).
54. There is a serious dispute about whether hedge fund activism produces long-run value
increases in targeted corporations. Compare John Armour, Shareholder Rights, 36 OXFORD REV.
ECON. POL’Y 314, 335 (2020) (arguing that the exercise of shareholder rights focusing on market
pricing leads to short termism), and Ed deHaan, David Larcker & Charles McClure, Long-Term
Economic Consequences of Hedge Fund Activist Interventions, 24 REV. ACCT. STUD. 536 (2019)
(showing post-activism long-term returns insignificantly different from zero), with Lucian Bebchuk,
Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1085, 1120 (2015) (finding no evidence that hedge fund activism has long-term negative effects).
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monitoring model was incomplete; the model failed to incorporate
mechanisms for shareholders to engage directly with boards of directors.55
Modest is not the adjective used to characterize the record of successful
activist shareholders. Activist investors’ value in the monitoring process is
documented by the substantial average announcement return in the targeted
company’s stock price upon an activist hedge fund’s announcement
following notice of a position in the company.56 In an important recent
working paper, Vyacheslav Fos and his co-authors show that activist
investors increase firm value by influencing the target firm’s corporate
policies. Their estimates are that an average of 4.77%, which is 75.2% of the
total observed Schedule 13D filing returns, are the result of changes at the
target firm.57 Moreover, these activist funds have a holding period longer than
the average investor.58 Although the activist funds more frequently
collaborate with the target company’s management than pursue more
confrontational alternatives, the evidence reflects that both executive
compensation and the executives themselves are on the chopping block.59 We
see that when the monitoring model is joined by an engaged institutional
holder, boards restrain executive compensation—something not observed
when the only actor is the independent directors. Moreover, in an era of
activist investors, boards have become even more willing to terminate poorly
performing CEOs when supported by the activist investor.60
The impact of hedge fund activists is widespread. One recent study
reports that from 2000 to 2013 there were 3,012 campaigns initiated by
activist hedge funds.61 From January to August of 2019, activists launched
205 campaigns and won 76 board seats.62 This is down from a record 360

55. Different types of shareholders will engage in different types and levels of monitoring of
the firms in their portfolios. Julian Franks, Institutional Ownership and Governance, 36 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 258, 267–68 (2020) (comparing active asset managers, passive asset managers,
and hedge fund activists and concluding that hedge fund activists spend “much greater resources”
than other asset managers and concentrate on strategic issues).
56. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1755–57 (2008); Rui Albuquerque,
Vyacheslav Fos & Enrique J. Schroth, Value Creation in Shareholder Activism: A Structural
Approach 41 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 685/2020, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3639636 [https://perma.cc/PC7J-AQW3].
57. Albuquerque et al., supra note 56, at 3.
58. Brav et al., supra note 56, at 1731–32, 1747 tbl.2.
59. Id. at 1732.
60. Id. at 1770.
61. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas Keusch, Dancing with Activists, 137
J. FIN. ECON. 1, 5 tbl.1 (2020).
62. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2019 U.S.
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 3 (2019), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/2019
ShareholderActivismAnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y573-DLS8].
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campaigns in 2015.63 Overall, the activists’ strategy is to influence the
targeted board, not to dominate it.64 Success for such campaigns must be
assessed over time. The outcomes achieved in the campaigns reflect that
activists are meeting with increasing success. For example, 0.7 board seats
were won per campaign (a 35% increase from 2017).65 In a very extensive
study of hedge fund activism, the authors found that 13% resulted in
settlements, whereas 5% were pursued to contested shareholder votes.66
Settlements as a rule entail the target adding new directors to its board; this
has the effect of bringing about an “increase in the number of activistaffiliated, activist-desired, and well-connected directors and [a] decrease [in]
the number of old and long-tenured directors,” as well as planting the seeds
for serious changes in corporate strategy and leadership.67 Thus, following
activist campaigns, nearly half of all issuers that added activist designees to
their boards in 2017 and 2018 either sold themselves or engaged in a
meaningful divestiture, and the rate of CEO turnover at target companies
between 2013 and 2017 increased to between 23% and 28%.68
Public perception of activist investors is also improving. Research
indicates that activist strategies are increasingly focused on long-term vision
and value creation rather than a short-term burst of share buybacks.69 CEOs
are beginning to engage with activists and, at least in one case, even solicit
their involvement in major corporate reform or restructuring.70 Other CEOs
have adopted “internal activism” as a method of management.71 The constant

63. David Benoit, Activism’s Long Road From Corporate Raiding to Banner Year, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 26, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activisms-long-road-from-corporateraiding-to-banner-year-1451070910 [https://perma.cc/ZXF7-QX5W].
64. Bebchuk et al., supra note 61, at 34. The modesty of the activists’ actions is reflected in the
observation that the activist was affiliated with barely one-half (52%) of the new directors added to
the board in the months that followed their campaign. Id. at 14 tbl.5, panel B.
65. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 62, at 2.
66. Bebchuk et al., supra note 61, at 5. Indeed, activists filed proxy materials as part of their
steps to engage the target in only 12% of the 3,012 campaigns and ultimately pursued matters to a
contested vote in only 38% of those instances. Id. at tbl.1.
67. Id. at 3.
68. See LAZARD LTD., REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM—3Q 2017 1 (2017), https://
www.lazard.com/media/450309/lazard-review-of-shareholder-activism-q3-2017-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UQ63-NJD4] (finding an average annualized CEO turnover of 23% by activist targets);
Bebchuk, supra note 61, at 25 (finding that CEO turnover spikes at an annual 28% in the year after
a settlement).
69. Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV.
1246, 1254, 1261 (2017).
70. Id. at 1262–63 (summarizing an engagement where the CEO of the General Electric
Company invited an activist, Nelson Peltz, “to invest in the company and become active in
reforming it”).
71. Liz Hoffman, More Companies Deal with Multiple Activists, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10,
2015, 7:08 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-companies-deal-with-multiple-activists1439248120 [https://perma.cc/M7TE-9YDV].
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threat of activism continues to shape the corporate landscape, as any
company of any size is a potential target.
Illustrative of modern governance at work are the decade-long
experiences of Dow and Dupont, as well as their merged company
DowDuPont. One of the many messages from their odyssey is that no firm is
too big to be the object of activist hedge funds. In 2013, DuPont was a
company with $67.5 billion market capitalization and had been a sprawling
marquee company engaged in a range of product areas since its founding over
200 years ago.72 After disclosing its investment in August 2013 and
subsequently engaging in talks with management, Trian Fund Management,
L.P. formally voiced its concerns in an open letter to the DuPont board and
all shareholders in September 2014.73 The letter described at length how
Trian believed the conglomerate structure of DuPont was destroying
shareholder value, that the board was no longer interested in holding
management accountable, and that DuPont should reorganize its various lines
of business into three separate companies focused on different industries.74
Management, led by CEO Ellen Kullman, promptly rejected Trian’s
proposal, which led to Trian launching a full-scale proxy fight in January
2015.75 This was one of the largest ever proxy contests led by an activist and
resulted in DuPont management narrowly winning shareholder support in
May 2015.76 However, five months later, Ellen Kullman quietly retired as
CEO of DuPont and was replaced by then-director Edward Breen.77
Meanwhile, a major DuPont competitor, Dow Chemical, was handling
an activist challenge from Third Point, which was also calling for extensive
corporate restructuring.78 Dow was able to avoid a proxy fight, however, by

72. David Benoit & Jacob Bunge, Nelson Peltz Launches Proxy Fight Against DuPont, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2015, 9:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nelson-peltz-launches-proxy-fight
-against-dupont-1420761264 [https://perma.cc/YX4P-4RSV].
73. Letter from Trian Fund Mgmt. L.P., to Board of Directors, DuPont Co. (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/TrianDuPont.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BUEQD8V].
74. Id.
75. Benoit & Bunge, supra note 72.
76. Tom Hals, DuPont Wins Board Proxy Fight Against Activist Investor Peltz, REUTERS
(May 13, 2015, 8:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dupont-trian/dupont-wins-boardproxy-fight-against-activist-investor-peltz-idUSKBN0NY1JI20150513 [https://perma.cc/2BV6X4Z6].
77. David Benoit, Four Activists Challenge Plans to Carve up DowDuPont, WALL ST. J.
(July 30, 2017, 7:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-carve-up-dowdupont-fouractivists-sharpen-their-knives-1501412580 [https://perma.cc/67S6-Z7LL].
78. Jack Kaskey, Dow Chemical Pact with Loeb’s Third Point Avoids Proxy Fight,
GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
international-business/us-business/dow-chemical-pact-with-loebs-third-point-avoids-proxy-fight/
article21703009/ [https://perma.cc/ZXZ4-Z6L2].
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settling with Third Point and agreeing to add four new independent
directors.79
With all of this as background, Dow and DuPont began discussing a
potential combination in October 2015.80 The plan, formally unveiled in
December 2015, envisioned a merger-of-equals between the two companies
followed by a breakup of the newly formed DowDuPont into three
independent, publicly traded entities.81 At this point even more activists
joined the fray, with Jana Partners and Glenview Capital Management
joining Trian and Third Point in critiquing the proposed $150 billion deal.82
This was the beginning of a multi-year struggle over the direction of the
proposed breakup plan, with activists successfully pushing for the retirement
of DowDuPont Executive Chairman (and former Dow Chemical CEO)
Andrew Liveris and retooling various aspects of the breakup deal itself. 83
DowDuPont CEO Edward Breen ended up openly engaging with the activist
investors while designing the deal, admitting that activists raised fair points
and that having them involved and supportive of the deal was valuable to the
process.84 In a December 2018 interview, Mr. Breen advised CEOs to engage
with activists: “[t]alk to them and understand exactly all the details of where
they’re coming from. You’re not going to agree with them on everything, but
they’re doing their homework also and sometimes they’re making some
pretty good points.”85 The engagement of DuPont, Dow and DowDuPont by
activist hedge funds is neither isolated nor a cherry-picked illustration.
The lesson we emphasize from the above is that the strategies advanced
in these campaigns and ultimately pursued were formulated and initiated
outside the target company’s boardroom and would not have been successful
if the targeted firm believed the strategy did not have substantial support
among institutional holders. Thus, activist holders supplement the
monitoring model by providing their independent evaluation of the firm’s
performance and management’s stewardship, and by advancing alternative
strategies in the shareholders’ interests. All of this information is eventually
shared with the targeted firm’s board. In doing so, the hedge funds help the

79. Id. Of note is that two of these directors were receiving base and incentive compensation
from Third Point, a so-called “Golden Leash” arrangement.
80. David Benoit, Dow, DuPont Deal Underscores Rise of Activists, WALL ST. J. (Europe),
Dec. 14, 2015, at B1.
81. Dan Primack, Dow Chemical and DuPont Announce Mega-Merger, FORTUNE (Dec. 11,
2015, 6:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2015/12/11/dow-chemical-and-dupont-announce-megamerger/ [https://perma.cc/KBS9-SDBN].
82. Benoit, supra note 77.
83. Id.
84. Jacob Bunge, Meet the Breakup Artist Taking Apart DowDuPont, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-breakup-artist-taking-apart-dowdupont11545832801 [https://perma.cc/E56Z-YJK9].
85. Id.
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directors to overcome the time, information, and other talent constraints on
the target board members.
Importantly for the thesis of this article, the advent of the activist
investor reflects the incompleteness of the monitoring model as initially
conceived and hence the inherent weakness that prevents a director-centric
model from achieving its full potential. The directors, though independent,
suffer acute time, information, talent, and psychological constraints86 that in
combination can impact their ability to undertake an impartial, penetrating,
and sweeping assessment of the strategies pursued by the firm’s
management. The campaigns of activist hedge funds are mechanisms by
which, through a credible shareholder threat, the target board initiates closer
and more independent evaluation of management’s stewardship. Such an
impetus can be thought of as “error correction” and when it results in the true
correction of course it produces shareholder value. Thus, activist campaigns
demonstrate how the objectives of the monitoring model are strengthened by
deep shareholder involvement and that such involvement fills a gap that
persists in the contemporary board-centric model.87
In the next section, we set forth several contemporary judicial and
regulatory developments whose very existence is dramatically at odds with
the fact that ownership of public companies is highly concentrated in the
hands of various types of financial institutions and that their power is closely
connected to that of third-party proxy voting advisors and hedge fund
activists.
III. Girding Against Hedge Fund and Shareholder Activism: Chipping
Away at the Legal Rules that Form Their Foundations
Unquestionably, the rise of financial institutions, the emergence of
third-party voting advisors, and the concomitant appearance of hedge fund
activism are the most significant developments to impact the public
corporation in the last fifty years. The separation of ownership from
management, captured nearly a century ago by Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means, still persists, but the problem is no longer exacerbated by the
collective action problem associated with shares owned almost entirely by
investors with holdings too small to justify being other than rationally

86. Moreover, because the target board has not only been involved with the strategies
challenged by the activist but also likely identifies as well with their implementing management,
the board cannot be expected to quickly cast aside those connections and consider an outsider’s
proposals neutrally. Hence, the engagement between the targeted board and the activist is at least
initially adversarial.
87. Consistent with our thesis, Professors Fisch and Sepe also suggest that a board’s relationship
with outside investors has become more collaborative in recent years. Jill E. Fisch & Simone M.
Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEXAS L. REV. 863, 873 (2020) (reasoning that through such
interactions the “partial information” problem of the cloistered directors is addressed).
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apathetic. Not surprisingly, the changes that have ensued have unsettled
managers. Their angst has unleashed a series of developments that confront
shareholder activism.
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has turned
its attention to the regulatory regime governing the proxy voting process.88
In 2018, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management withdrew its noaction guidance that enabled institutional investors to rely on proxy advisory
recommendations.89 On November 5, 2019, in response to critics of the proxy
advisory industry, the SEC voted to propose amendments to the Exchange
Act rules regulating proxies.90 On July 22, 2020, the SEC adopted
amendments to its rules governing proxy voting advice.91
The amendments to Rules 14a–1(l), 14a–2(b)(1), and 14a–2(b)(3)
expand the circumstances in which proxy voting advice would constitute a
solicitation and thus be regulated.92 And amendments to Rules 14a–2(b)(1)
and 14a–2(b)(3) require proxy advisory firms to disclose material conflicts
of interest in their proxy voting advice, to provide companies an opportunity
to review and provide feedback on the proxy voting advice before it is
released, and to grant registrants an option to request that the proxy voting
firms include in their voting advice a hyperlink to the registrants’ written
statement describing their views on such voting advice.93 Finally, the
amendment to Rule 14a–9 details examples of when the failure to disclose
certain information in the proxy voting advice could be misleading within the
meaning of the rule.94 The net effect of these changes will be to hamstring
proxy advisors’ ability to provide candid, private advice to their clients.
Another area of resistance to activist shareholders is imposing early
warning requirements that impede the activist. The most straightforward
88. Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War Against Proxy Advisors, N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 26–27), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3488427 [https://
perma.cc/G8DA-SP7P].
89. Id. at 26.
90. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rule
Amendments to Improve Accuracy and Transparency of Proxy Voting Advice (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-231 [https://perma.cc/989C-DQUM].
91. Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rule
Amendments to Provide Investors Using Proxy Voting Advice More Transparent, Accurate and
Complete Information (July 22, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-161 [https://
perma.cc/36FJ-23WX] .
92. Id.
93. Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,082, 55,096–
97, 55,201 (Sept. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). See also id. at 55,096 (listing
examples of cases where “the interests of a proxy voting advice business may diverge materially
from the interests of the clients who utilize their advice” and noting that circumstances in such
examples “create a risk that the proxy voting advice business’s voting advice could be influenced
by the business’s own interests, which may call into question the objectivity and independence of
its advice”).
94. Id. at 55,121.
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reforms in this area are reflected in the repeated calls and growing support
for reducing the beneficial ownership level that compels the activist investor
to announce its presence and plans. This area is regulated by Section 13(d)(1)
of the Securities Exchange Act, which now compels public disclosure once
more than 5% of a reporting company’s equity securities are acquired.95
However, there is a ten-day grace period for making the filing after
surpassing that level during which such beneficial holder can continue to
acquire the issuer’s shares96 so that when the filing is ultimately made that
holder may own nearly double the triggering amount.97 Proposals are to
reduce the triggering ownership requirement as well as shorten or eliminate
the grace period.
The reforms proposed will have consequential effects for the activist
hedge fund. We believe the most significant impact of the reforms is not that
they erode any strategic advantage the hedge fund garners by delaying
announcement of its ownership and the changes it believes its target should
undertake but that they impact the activist’s expected gain from its actions.
Once disclosure is made, the target’s stock price will on average rise. Under
the current 5% trigger and ten-day grace window, the activist can purchase
shares at a lower price than would be expected if public markets were aware
of the activist’s intentions. Thus, the reforms would reduce the financial
incentives for the activist to undertake the quest. Moreover, earlier
announcement would allow the target to issue a poison pill with a low
ownership trigger that effectively caps the activist’s ownership at a very low
level, also reducing the expected benefits of undertaking the campaign.
Another early warning device is the advance notice bylaw. Most
corporate statutes do not require that stockholders give advance notice in
order to introduce business or nominate directors at an annual meeting. To
fill this gap and thereby remove a strategic advantage of surprise from
disgruntled stockholders, corporations have explicitly imposed such a
requirement via an advance notice bylaw.98 Advance notice bylaws have two
purposes: to ensure the orderly functioning of shareholder meetings99 and to

95. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1).
96. Id.
97. See Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Returns to Hedge Fund
Activism, 64 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 45, 49 (2008) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of events involved a
purchase of 5–10 percent of target shares.”).
98. See, e.g., JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch.
2008) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(a) (2001)) (referencing Delaware’s default rules
allowing stockholders to make proposals at annual meetings without advance notice); Openwave
Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 238–39 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(defining advance notice bylaws and noting Delaware courts’ frequent upholding of their validity).
In the case of director nominations, such bylaws also often require that shareholders provide certain
specified information about the nominees. Id.
99. Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 239.
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be used as a defensive strategy against activist shareholders.100 The former is
achieved by ensuring that shareholders can prepare and inform themselves
prior to a vote.101 The latter is achieved by allowing the incumbent board time
to mount a defensive strategy against insurgents.102 Advance notice bylaws
have now become a standard fixture within U.S. companies103 and are very
much a strategic consideration in contests between managers and activists
who may resort to the ballot as a means for questioning the incumbents’
stewardship or a particular transaction.
The power of shareholders to propose bylaws empowering them to
nominate directors is another important example of the SEC’s retreat from
empowering shareholders. In 2010, the SEC invoked the authority conferred
on it by the Dodd–Frank legislation by adopting Rule 14a–11, which
provided a mechanism for shareholders of reporting companies who
individually collectively owned 3% of the issuer’s shares for three years to
nominate up to one-fourth of the board. Faulting the SEC for failing to engage
in cost–benefit analysis sufficient to justify the rule, the Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held in Business Roundtable v. SEC104 that the rule was
arbitrary and capricious.105
Surprisingly, Business Roundtable makes no reference whatsoever to
the Dodd–Frank Act’s express authorization for a rule providing proxy access
or to the fact that the SEC acted pursuant to that authority.106 The grant of
authority to the SEC not only was unqualified but also clearly anticipated that
the SEC would adopt a rule that provided terms and conditions for what the
agency believed was appropriate proxy access.107 The D.C. Circuit’s analysis,
100. See AARON RACHELSON, JOY M. BRYAN & PAUL W. RICHTER, CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS & DIVESTITURES § 1:161(2), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2020)
(suggesting that corporate management consider amending bylaws to include a notice requirement
as a defensive strategy).
101. Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 239.
102. RACHELSON ET AL., supra note 100.
103. See, e.g., Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 238–39 (citing Mentor Graphics Corp. v.
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 43 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)) (noting that advance notice
bylaws are “commonplace” in Delaware corporations); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Director
Nominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 136 (2014).
104. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
105. Id. at 1156. For a biting critique of the court’s reasoning, see generally James D. Cox &
Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation
of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1811 (2012).
106. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(a)).
107. See S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 146–47 (2010) (discussing proxy access and the Section’s
grant of great discretion to the SEC in delineating such access). While stating that Section 972 of
the Dodd–Frank Act did not require the SEC to engage in rulemaking, the committee report
recognized that the provision gave the SEC “wide latitude in setting the terms” of proxy access. Id.
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focusing exclusively on the broad policy question that Congress had taken
off the table, is misdirected. By enacting Dodd–Frank, Congress embraced
the broader concept of shareholder access, leaving it to the SEC to identify
how that vision was to be achieved. So viewed, the D.C. Circuit’s review
most appropriately should have been confined to the details of the proposal.
With Rule 14a–11 gone, activist shareholders have pursued self-help
using the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule. In response, companies have
exploited the grounds for omitting a proposal when it conflicts with the
proposal submitted by management.108 In a significant no-action letter
involving Whole Foods, the SEC held that a proposal submitted by
shareholders could be omitted because it conflicted with that of
management.109 The SEC staff reached this position even though there were
several substantive differences between the shareholder’s proposal and the
proposal supported by management.
Perhaps no voting-related development defies gravity more than the
inability of the SEC to resist the self-preservation instincts of CEOs to its
proposal for a “universal proxy” in contested elections. In 2016, the SEC
proposed the use of a “universal proxy” to accommodate activist shareholders
who advance a short slate of nominees.110 As a practical matter, a shareholder
who does not attend the stockholder meeting is unable to vote for some of
management’s nominees and the nominees of the dissidents on the dissidents’
proxy. This is because, under corporate law, if a shareholder submits two
different proxies the most recently executed proxy is counted on the theory it
revokes the earlier proxy.111 As proposed by the SEC, when there is a
contested board election, the proxy used by management and the insurgent
must include the names of all the nominees, those of management and those
of the insurgent, so that shareholders can thereby choose among all the
candidates rather than being forced into an all-or-nothing choice.
at 146. The report explained that “[t]he Committee fe[lt] that it [was] proper for shareholders, as the
owners of the corporation, to have the right to nominate candidates for the Board using the issuer’s
proxy under limited circumstances.” Id.
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(i)(9) (2010).
109. Whole Foods Market, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 414 (Dec. 1,
2014).
110. Tiffany Fobes Campion, Christopher R. Drewry & Joshua M. Dubofsky, Universal
Proxies: What Companies Need to Know, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 1 (Dec. 5,
2018) (citing SEC, Universal Proxy, Exchange Act Release No. 79,164 (October 16, 2018)), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/12/05/universal-proxies-what-companies-need-to-know
[https://
perma.cc/HVF6-9LM9].
111. The dissident can try to overcome this feature by including on its proxy not only its
nominees but also some of management’s nominees so that solicited shareholders have a sense that
they are voting for the exact number of nominees as there are seats up for election. But the
management nominees the dissident chooses to include may well not be the nominees the
shareholder would have preferred among the larger set of management nominees. The universal
proxy overcomes this problem.
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Contestants, however, will have to direct shareholders to each other’s proxy
statements for information regarding the background of their respective
candidates. In the face of strong opposition from company CEOs, who argued
the universal proxy would prove disruptive, the SEC has not pursued this
topic further.
The preceding are just a few of the examples we can raise of important
legal developments that share a common theme: the weakening of the
shareholder voice in corporate governance. Most importantly, each of these
developments is critical when the shareholders are focused on the important
matter of management stewardship of the firm, where shareholder action is
not just a mechanism for correcting course but likely the only mechanism for
doing so.
IV. Back to the Future: A Utopian Prescription through “Patient Capital”
A.

The Framework of the New Paradigm
The tightly drawn battle lines separating the management-centric and
investor-centric governance encampments have long nurtured their dispute
on whether an investor focus is one that inevitably is harmful because it
naturally invites the pursuit of short-term financial gains at the expense of
long-term financial objectives.
A short-term mindset in managing and investing in businesses has
become pervasive and is profoundly destructive to the long-term
health of the economy. Short-termism erodes the foundation for future
innovation, ingenuity in product enhancements and the research and
development that makes possible medical breakthroughs,
technological progress and scientific advances. It undercuts
investments in employees, factories and equipment, expansion into
new markets and the pursuit of other long-term projects that require
up-front costs but have the potential for sustainable value creation and
social impact.112
Furthermore, in an era of rising concerns for ESG matters and especially with
a growing interest in sustainability, the advocates for a management-centric
structure of corporate governance anchor their position in those concerns. In
doing so, one detects more than the whiff of nostalgia to return to the halcyon
days of managerialism. It is this perspective that frames the contemporary
calls for a culture of patient capital as well as various governance initiatives
112. MARTIN LIPTON, STEVEN A. ROSENBLUM, SEBASTIAN V. NILES, SARA J. LEWIS & KISHO
WATANABE, INT’L BUS. COUNCIL OF THE WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE NEW PARADIGM: A
ROADMAP FOR AN IMPLICIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATIONS
AND INVESTORS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 5 (2016),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DY99-98C6].
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needed to foster that culture. The lament regarding short-termism is now
embodied in a rich vision for corporate stewardship called “The New
Paradigm.”113
It is not our purpose here to engage in the short-term versus long-term
debate.114 We believe that regardless of which is the more likely perspective
pursued, neither alters our central thesis: the effectiveness of the monitoring
model requires potency for the shareholders’ voice, and the prescriptions
which make up the New Paradigm weaken the shareholder’s voice. As
developed below, after a close review of governance proposals to establish a
culture of “patient capital,” we believe these proposals are instead a
prescription for “neutered capital” as the reforms now in the air ask
institutional holders to forsake their power of error correction—the central
justification for the shareholder vote.115
The most fully developed model for patient capital is set forth in a white
paper whose lead author is the iconic Martin Lipton, a long-time advocate for
the cause of long-termism and the management-centric perspective.
In essence, the New Paradigm recalibrates the relationship between
public corporations and their major institutional investors and
conceives of corporate governance as a collaboration among
corporations, shareholders and other stakeholders working together to
achieve long-term value and resist short-termism. In this framework,
if a corporation, its board of directors and its CEO and management
team are diligently pursuing well-conceived strategies that were
developed with the participation of independent, competent and
engaged directors, and its operations are in the hands of competent
executives, investors will support the corporation and refuse to
support short-term financial activists seeking to force short-term value
enhancements without regard to long-term value implications. As part
of their stewardship role, institutional investors will work to
understand corporations’ strategies and operations and engage with
them to provide corporations with opportunities to understand the
investors’ opinions and to adjust strategies and operations in order to
receive the investors’ support.116

113. See Steven A. Rosenblum, Hedge Fund Activism, Short-Termism, and a New Paradigm of
Corporate Governance, 126 YALE L.J. F. 538, 543–48 (2017) (providing a crisp summary of the
New Paradigm and its dependence on agreement to long-term objectives by asset managers and
their portfolio companies’ managers).
114. For such an engagement offering a close examination of the many points raised within the
short-term, long-term debate, see generally Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact,
167 U. PA. L. REV. 71 (2018).
115. Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. Edelman, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Voting at
US Public Companies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 459, 464, 467–68
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
116. LIPTON ET AL., supra note 112, at 1 (emphasis added).
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The above is not itself controversial and surely captures, at least, the
preliminary steps of even activist investors.
What is important is how the white paper recalibrates practices that
institutional investors should follow. They are encouraged to “take an active
but measured role in supporting long-term investment.”117 This calls for each
institutional investor not only to develop firm objectives focused on longterm performance for each of its portfolio companies but also to develop
“expertise and staffing necessary to formulate its own voting guidelines,
communicate with corporations and evaluate matters presented to a
shareholder vote” against the so-developed objectives.118 The diversified
portfolio manager will most certainly see these tasks to be burdensome,
especially with respect to the possibly hundreds of companies held by the
fund. Recall that such concerns prompted the need for—and hence the growth
of—proxy advisors whose expertise arose from repeated experiences with a
range of shareholder proposals as well as executive compensation resolutions
and ultimately their promulgation of extensive guidelines in considering
recurring matters.
Even though resorting to proxy advisors is economically efficient, this
practice is rejected by the white paper,119 so that each institutional investor
must incur the cost to inform itself or quietly acquiesce to the portfolio
company’s managers. Since there is no evidence that funds totally defer to
their proxy advisors, and there is evidence that proxy advisors’
recommendations do not dominate voting decisions, it is not clear whether
this part of the New Paradigm is more than celebrating practices currently
followed. More telling is that when an institution concludes that a particular
portfolio company violates the fund’s objectives, the New Paradigm calls on
the institution to “provide the corporation with prompt notice of its concerns
and invite the corporation to engage with the investor”120 and thereafter
“work together toward the creation of sustainable long-term value.”121 This
by itself is not of concern; however, the New Paradigm does not address what
117. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 17.
119. Id. (“[A]n investor should not outsource to a proxy advisory firm that uses inflexible
metrics to make its recommendations . . . .”). The authors’ preferred response is that embraced in
Commonsense Principles 2.0, endorsed in October 2018 by numerous leading executives, whereby
asset managers should disclose the extent they rely on proxy advisors and should be satisfied that
the information upon which they are relying is accurate and relevant and their advisors have
processes to address conflicts of interest. COMMONSENSE CORP. GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES
(October 2018), https://www.governanceprinciples.org [https://perma.cc/9RS7-ZH6K]. See also
Commonsense Principles 2.0, COMMONSENSE CORP. GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 11,
https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/images/Commonsense%20Principles/
CommonsensePrinciples2.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS6K-YHZN]. Moreover, asset managers should
also make public their proxy voting process, voting guidelines and engagement protocols. Id.
120. LIPTON ET AL., supra note 112, at 18.
121. Id. at 17.
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should occur when the shareholder continues to disagree with the direction
of the firm. The white paper eschews consideration of any leverage the
institutional owner may pursue and what it does prescribe is tightly
circumscribed: first talk, then more talk.122
Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, now a
partner at the Wachtell Lipton law firm, has recently offered a series of
proposals that complement those advanced by the New Paradigm.123 In
addition to enhanced disclosures related to the operation and incentives of
the activists,124 Strine proposes sweeping regulation of proxy advisory firms
and institutional investors’ current voting practices. For example, while
observing that index funds are the quintessential long-term investor and their
business is premised on extremely low operating costs, he nonetheless
reasons they “should be precluded from relying on proxy advisory firms that
do not provide guidance tailored to index funds’ unique buy-and-hold
perspective.”125 More broadly, he believes that index and mutual funds
“should be required to have voting policies specifically tailored to the longterm purposes of those investments.”126 Even though the preceding practices
are in large part designed to enhance the voice of the fund, Strine calls for
rolling back federal requirements that funds vote on all matters submitted to
them; he instead prefers that individual funds be permitted to choose from
among matters calling for a vote.127
Clearly what is new under the New Paradigm and Strine’s
complementary arguments is driving financial institutions to committing to
long-term performance objectives,128 engaging management with only those
objectives in mind, evaluating management’s stewardship toward the
objectives without the assistance of proxy advisors, and eliminating any
122. This void should be compared to the guidelines formed by a large consortium of
international asset managers. See INT’L CORP. GOVERNANCE NETWORK, ICGN GLOBAL
STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES, 16 (setting forth Principle 4.3 Engagement Escalation that includes
shareholder proposals, nomination of directors, and exiting or threatening to exit among the steps
responsible stewards should consider when unhappy with the management of a portfolio company).
123. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective
on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870,
1956–69 (2017) (offering policy proposals that seek to diminish the risks that hedge fund activism
poses while retaining its benefits).
124. Id. at 1957–58.
125. Id. at 1965.
126. Id. at 1966. He further observes that this would enable funds to better enable investors to
gauge if a fund advertising itself as socially responsible and pursuing sustainable investments is
achieving that objective. Id.
127. Id. at 1966–67.
128. Similarly, the European Union’s recent directive embraces governance-related
mechanisms designed to focus companies and investors on the pursuit of long-term performance.
See Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 Amending
Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement,
2017 O.J. (L 132) 1–9 (EU).
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alternative to disciplining wayward management other than continued
engagement with management. As such, the New Paradigm only partially
maps existing practices by financial institutions and, more significantly,
weakens the shareholders’ voice in the boardroom.
Public companies regularly engage with their investors, especially
financial institutions and their advisors, on an intense basis. This has been
generally observed since at least the mid-1980s. Wealth managers indeed
benefit greatly through such active involvement. A recent study of the
multiple means by which a large money manager of actively managed mutual
funds carries out its monitoring through engagement with its portfolio
companies describes levels of intense systematic evaluation of each company
that includes a good deal of engagement by its professionals with highranking company officers.129 Significantly, the study links such active
engagement with the manager with garnering alpha for the various portfolios
the manager controlled. Good stewardship by money managers rewards its
managers.130 BlackRock’s stewardship programs are designed to ensure that
their personnel have direct engagement with corporate directors at the
companies they invest in. Thus, the New Paradigm embraces an important
ongoing practice of many financial institutions. Where the New Paradigm
diverges from the status quo is that in recent years we see mutual funds more
frequently vote against management proposals,131 while voting in favor of
hedge fund activists in their campaigns. This is not a practice considered in
the New Paradigm or by Strine.
Such fund engagement, however, is deeply qualified by the recent rise
of passive investment strategies, such as those practiced by index funds.
Professors Bebchuk and Hirst’s study of three major asset managers pours
cold water on the New Paradigm.132 They persuasively reason that index fund
managers have weak incentives to engage in monitoring the managers of
portfolio firms133 and support that view with extensive data showing the Big
Three do not engage managers on their operational issues but support fairly

129. See Becht et al., supra note 52, at 8 (noting, for example, that fund managers base trading
decisions on quarterly analyst reports that are internally circulated).
130. Id. at 24.
131. BRIAN CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY TRANSFORMED 313 (2019) (attributing this
change, in part, to the SEC introducing in 2003 a requirement for mutual funds to disclose their
voting decisions for their portfolio companies).
132. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2033–34 (2019).
133. See id. at 2047, 2050 (noting that in addition to the issue of non-trivial costs to monitor a
portfolio company there is a free rider problem that the fruits derived will be shared proportionally
by slothful competitors).
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stylized guidelines they develop to identify governance practices believed to
have deviated from well-received norms.134
The recent article by Professors Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber, which
sets forth reasons to believe that index funds can be expected to be both
strong supporters and likely even proponents of social issues, also argues that
index fund managers lack incentives to focus non-trivial resources on
operational issues not related to social issues that they believe are not as
strongly supported by their investors.135 As such, a significant portion of all
publicly traded equities are controlled by passive owners who do not engage
their portfolio company managers on the type of issues that are the focus of
the New Paradigm. Even in a world of index fund managers being so focused,
it does not seem reasonable to us to take the position that they lack a duty to
vote and that they should be required to do so in an informed way. The earlier
review of the positive effects of hedge fund activism is grounds alone for
index managers supporting what they or their advisors believe are positive
value resolutions and doing so is consistent with their obligations to their
investors. To be sure, investors in the S&P 500 Index Fund expect that
Caterpillar will be among the holdings and in proportion to its value of the
portfolio; investors do not expect that the fund managers will ignore their
advisor’s recommendation to support a proposal reasonably designed to
increase Caterpillar’s returns. And, viewed more broadly, to reason otherwise
would effectively remove the discipline of, and hence a sense of
accountability to, a significant portion of a corporation’s ownership. Simply
stated, the fiduciary obligations of asset managers following an indexing
strategy do not absolve the manager of the necessity to vote; as fund
fiduciaries they have a duty when voting to do so in an informed manner and
consistent with their stewardship obligations respecting the assets in the
portfolio.136 Mere adherence to holding proportionate interests in an

134. Id. at 2090–93 (showing that the Big Three cast “no” advisory notes on CEO compensation
one-third as often as a cohort of ten active fund managers). See also CHEFFINS, supra note 131, at
377 (noting that index funds focus on “keeping costs as low as possible and eliminating tracking
errors”).
135. Michael Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund
ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1248, 1257
(2020).
136. Funds, especially index funds, generally delegate “voting authority to an investment
advisor . . . [with] a fiduciary duty ‘to vote proxies of portfolio securities in the best interest of fund
shareholders.’” Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund
Giants, 79 MD. L. REV. 954, 1004 (2020). The SEC, however, has made it clear that funds do not
need to “cast votes in every election on every issue proposed by portfolio companies . . . [and]
should perform a cost–benefit analysis to determine whether the effort involved in researching the
issue exceeds the potential value to the fund of casting an informed vote.” Ann M. Lipton, Family
Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligation, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 175, 186 (2017).
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identifiable cohort of companies is not the sole requirement of responsible
asset stewardship.
Even though actively managed mutual funds do not suffer from the same
baked-in weak incentive structure discussed by Bebchuk and Hirst, they
nonetheless are at best followers in activist campaigns. Picking and choosing
investments, not changing the performance of portfolio companies, is their
trade. Nonetheless, they do pile on when they believe supporting the activist
agenda will increase the value of a portfolio company.137 The observed
support that actively managed mutual funds provide activist hedge funds
reflects the incompleteness of the New Paradigm; the force that is
communicated to a portfolio company’s management through engagement is
proportional to the steps that might follow if engagement does not lead to

The SEC focuses its regulation on investment advisors. It requires all registered investment
advisors to “adopt written policies and procedures . . . to ensure that [advisors] vote client securities
in the best interest of clients.” Maurice M. Lefkort, SEC Examines Passive Voting by Investors,
WHARTON MAG. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://magazine.wharton.upenn.edu/digital/sec-examinespassive-voting-by-investors/ [https://perma.cc/MQX3-MHQE]. It also allows investment advisors
to rely on an “independent third party (such as a proxy advisory firm)” to meet their obligations. Id.
See also Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance
Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803, 817 n.77 (2018) (noting that “SEC
material explicitly recognized that votes based upon the recommendations of an independent third
party can serve investment advisers to fulfill their fiduciary obligations under Rule 206(4)-6”).
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, index fund
directors and advisors have the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the funds they administer.
Lipton, supra, at 180. As part of both duties of care and loyalty, fund directors and boards of funds
have “a responsibility to oversee their fund’s affairs, including the voting of the fund’s proxies.”
MUT. FUND DIR’S FORUM, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR FUND DIRECTORS ON OVERSIGHT OF
PROXY VOTING 1 (2012), https://www.mfdf.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/
publications/white-papers/mergersweb.pdf?sfvrsn=e050f954_6
[https://perma.cc/PX2J-9RSH].
The SEC has stated its view that the duty of care requires an adviser with proxy voting authority to
monitor corporate events and to vote the proxies. See id. at 1–2.
In the past decade, the operative expression that has grown in usage is the “duty of prudence.”
Keith Johnson, Susan Gary & Cynthia Williams, Comment Letter: Fiduciary Duty
Guidance for Proxy Voting Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 2 (Nov. 27,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Harvard-CG-Blog-wendnotes-Proxy-voting-fiduciary-duty-Nov-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/92HM-7JA9]. See also
Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to
Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413, 426 (1995) (noting the
first use of the “prudent person” investment standard was from an 1830 ruling, Harvard College v.
Amory). The duty of prudence “requires that fiduciaries have a reasonable process in place to
investigate and verify facts relevant to investment decisions.” Johnson et al., supra, at 2. Other
authorities have merely used the standard of prudence as part of the duty of care, requiring a
fiduciary to “exercise the judgment and care that a prudent person would exercise in the
management of his or her own affairs.” Lipton, supra, at 180. Either way, prudence appears to be a
leading keyword regarding funds’ fiduciary obligations. See generally Bernard S. Sharfman, The
Conflict Between BlackRock’s Shareholder Activism and ERISA’s Fiduciary Duty, CASE W. RES.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (closely examining the obligation of institutional investors whose assets
in part are managed by advisors whose voting decisions are guided by their controlling shareholder).
137. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 47, at 891–92.
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change. More than talk must be in the institutional investor’s arsenal. Indeed,
it would appear inconsistent to champion dialogue between board and
shareholders around long-term goals and at the same time ask those same
shareholders not to act when their collective views are at odds with
management. Thus, we can see that repeated institutional engagement
regarding the same concerns can be expected to attract an even more bellicose
form of investor activism.
We therefore ask, what is added by the New Paradigm aside from
managers and their investors adhering to the nebulous north star of whether
a given initiative supports the pursuit of long-term value? As seen, evidence
reflects that passive investors adhere to a low-operating-cost strategy that
rejects meaningful sustained engagement to increase shareholder value.
Evidence also reflects that other investors do pursue alpha through
engagement, and their success, discussed earlier, reflects that they are
followed by investors who, though reticent to lead, are nonetheless eager to
embrace strategies believed to increase their returns. But in the next section
we suggest it harbors a more important mission.
B.

Stakeholder Primacy
The New Paradigm of corporate governance urges public corporations
to focus on broader stakeholder interests rather than exclusively focusing on
shareholder interests and investment returns.138 Inherent in the New
Paradigm is the growing chorus in favor of environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) initiatives, which provides that corporations should
“incorporate relevant sustainability, ESG (environmental, social and
governance) and CSR (corporate social responsibility) considerations in
developing their long-term strategies and operations planning.”139 The
commitment not just to ESG but to the stakeholder model was crisply
embraced in the summer of 2019 by members of the Business Roundtable;
the statement is an important development in light of the fact that the
organization is made up of hundreds of leading CEOs and other leaders of
public companies. The statement unqualifiedly embraced the view that “each
of our stakeholders is essential” and the companies embraced a “fundamental

138. Legally, in jurisdictions such as Delaware, it seems undisputed that managers are required
“to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” Edward Rock, For
Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose 8 (European
Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 515/2020, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3589951# [https://perma.cc/9TTN-SU5Q] (quoting C. William
Chandler of the Delaware Chancery Court).
139. LIPTON ET AL., supra note 112, at 2. See also id. at 18–19 (calling on institutional investors
to similarly take account of sustainability and ESG in their investment strategies and to engage
management of portfolio companies in a “robust dialogue” on the importance of ESG factors).

COX.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1302

7/18/2021 6:09 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1275

commitment to all of our stakeholders.”140 They committed to “lead their
companies for the benefit of all stakeholders,” and to deliver value not just to
shareholders but also to the benefit of “customers, employees, suppliers,
[and] communities.”141 The statement further observes that “[f]inancial
metrics such as total shareholder return and earnings targets will be balanced
against a more holistic understanding of firm value.”142
When such non-specific statements are made, however, there is a natural
concern that they are mere puffery. Consider that in the wake of the COVID19 pandemic many “key signatories are furloughing employees, paying
dividends to shareholders and provoking complaints from workers that they
aren’t adequately protected from danger.”143 Moreover, “[w]hen the
pandemic prompted companies to furlough or lay off thousands of
employees,” CEO pay cuts were minimal or non-existent.144
Nonetheless, in advocating this perspective, the New Paradigm
complements an important shareholder movement that has with increasing
frequency pressured boards and management to incorporate ESG initiatives
into long-term corporate strategies and business models,145 arguing that
“sustainability factors are critical to long-term business viability.”146 Indeed,
140. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote
‘An Economy that Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www
.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promotean-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/NNG9-ZUTH] (emphasis added).
141. Id. “The Business Roundtable did not provide specifics on how it would carry out its newly
stated ideals, offering more of a mission statement than a plan of action.” David Gelles & David
Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceoscorporations.html [https://perma.cc/KNW2-YX33]. In December of 2019, the World Economic
Forum published a manifesto urging companies to move from shareholder primacy to “stakeholder
capitalism,” thereby marking a worldwide push for the adoption of the New Paradigm. Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L.
REV. 91, 95 (2020).
142. LIPTON ET AL., supra note 112, at 6.
143. Peter S. Goodman, Big Business Pledged Gentler Capitalism. It’s Not Happening in a
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/business/businessroundtable-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/862H-7KUW] (“Their actions expose the reality that
the rhetoric of the Business Roundtable did not alter the decisive question of American capitalism
—where the money goes.”).
144. Peter Eavis, As the Pandemic Forced Layoffs, C.E.O.s Gave up Little, N.Y. TIMES
(July 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/29/business/economy/ceo-pay-pandemiclayoffs.html [https://perma.cc/K7CC-7A6J] (citing empirical study of CEO pay changes after the
COVID-19 outbreak).
145. Many core ESG issues have come from technological advancements and large-scale
societal changes, but they still implicate individual company decisions. Stavros Gadinis & Amelia
Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1408–09 (2020).
146. David M. Silk, Sabastian V. Niles & Carmen X.W. Lu, Accelerating ESG Disclosure–
WEF Task Force Releases Preliminary Framework Centered on Mainstream Reporting Aligned
with UN Sustainable Development Goals, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 1 (Feb. 3, 2020),
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investors are increasingly introducing ESG initiatives during board
engagements and through shareholder proposals.147 The movement is clearly
international; for example, between 2015 and 2018, a U.K.-based
institutional investor conducted 353 ESG engagements in the United
States.148 It is in this rising interest among the millennials that Professors
Barzuza, Curtis, and Webber rest their case that index funds will not be
passive with respect to ESG issues believed important to the wave of future
millennial-fund investors.
Because ESG metrics are not per se financial, social activists doubt that
corporate boards and management would independently pursue sustainable
strategies, as their fiduciary duties require them to maximize corporate profit
and shareholder financial returns. Thus, it is necessary for corporate leaders
to consider the preferences of non-shareholder stakeholders, including
employees, the community, supply-chain entities, and lenders—each of
whom somewhat supports the transition to sustainable and equitable
corporate decisions. And, a cornerstone of the New Paradigm is that investors
should not only similarly support this perspective, but also in their
engagement with management weigh these considerations with due
deference to management’s judgments regarding ESG considerations.149 This
perspective is, as seen above, embraced fully in the New Paradigm.
We see these embraces of the stakeholder model, especially in the dark
shadow of the New Paradigm’s overt weakening of shareholder activism, as
a déjà vu moment for corporate governance. We truly have been here before.
The New Paradigm aligns well with the discarded managerialism model in
that shareholders are weak and management is thus free to mediate among
competing constituent stakeholders. In the mid-1980s, corporate law flirted
with managerialism when numerous states enacted “other constituency”
statutes that broadened the protection afforded by the business judgment rule
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26775.20.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Q2VY-3B84].
147. ESG: Understanding the Issues, the Perspectives and the Path Forward, PWC,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/governance-insights-center/library/esg-environmental-socialgovernance-reporting.html [https://perma.cc/7Y5B-AME4].
148. Andreas G.F. Hoepner, Ioannis Oikonomou, Zacharias Sautner, Laura T. Starks & Xiao
Y. Zhou, ESG Shareholder Engagement and Downside Risk 9 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Finance Working Paper No. 671/2020, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2874252 [https://perma.cc/LG33-S8DP].
149. As of today, the U.S. government has failed to adopt substantive federal regulations
requiring ESG disclosures. In fact, the Labor Department is “seeking a new federal regulation that
could discourage retirement funds from making investments based on environmental, social and
governance considerations.” Noam Scheiber & Ron Lieber, Labor Dept. Seeks to Restrict Social
Goals in Retirement Investing, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
06/24/business/labor-retirement-investing.html [https://perma.cc/TLH4-R5CU] (“[T]he practical
effect of the new framing could be to deter plan administrators from adding E.S.G. options to 401(k)
plans for fear of violating the law.”). Thus, as discussed below, private parties have taken control
of expanding the New Paradigm and ESG initiatives across the corporate sector.
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by expressly empowering boards to consider non-shareholder interests in
decision-making.150 The impetus for other constituency statutes was the
frequency of hostile takeovers, many directed—as discussed earlier—at
lethargic companies still languishing in the practices of managerialism. It is
of note that the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar
Association rejected including an “other constituency” provision in its highly
influential Model Business Corporation Act, explaining that the provision is
inconsistent with managers being accountable essentially to anyone.151
Because so much of the New Paradigm rests on the earlier move to adopt
other constituency statutes, it is useful in evaluating the New Paradigm to
consider the analysis of Bebchuk and Tallarita, who closely examine the
differences among 32 state constituency statutes to highlight the difficulty in
adopting a one-size-fits-all definition of stakeholders.152 Their analysis found
that employees and customers were always included, but the definitions took
different forms when it came to suppliers, creditors, local communities,
society, economy of the state or nation, and the environment.153 Ironically,
proponents of stakeholderism have delegated the responsibility of defining
stakeholders to the board of directors, who have broad discretion in
identifying those who are affected by corporations’ decisions.154 The
difficulty in defining stakeholders implicitly makes any boardroom decisionmaking process more complex. It also likely makes the board decisions
impossible to evaluate so that the board can be held accountable.
Bebchuk and Tallarita identify three concrete critiques of
stakeholderism.155 The first criticism is that corporate directors’ and
management’s interests fail to align with those of corporate stakeholders
because officer and director compensation packages are typically equity150. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORP. L. & GOVERNANCE 1, 13 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2016), available at https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/
oxfordhb/9780198743682.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198743682-e-31
[https://perma.cc/DP6LXHYR]. Williams notes that:
[O]ther constituency statutes . . . give directors the statutory discretion to consider
constituents other than shareholders in making decisions, particularly decisions to
resist takeovers, have generally been interpreted to be relatively unimportant, and
underutilized, albeit with the potential to create ambiguity regarding directors’
duties . . . allow[ing] for greater experimentation within the firm . . . .
Id.
151. ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2253 (1990).
152. Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 141, at 116–19.
153. For ESG purposes, Arizona and Texas are the only two states whose statutes explicitly
mention the environment as a stakeholder. Id. at 117.
154. Id. at 119. There are also consequences for which stakeholder preferences are prioritized
by board decisions, as “companies will commonly face many opportunities to provide some
stakeholders with benefits that will come at the expense of shareholders.” Id. at 120.
155. Id. at 164.
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based,156 so their interests are aligned with shareholders but not with other
stakeholders.157 The CEO’s link to shareholders was strengthened by Dodd–
Frank’s mandate of say-on-pay requirements, which requires shareholders to
approve (via vote) executive compensation packages.158 Managerial pay
packages thus can be expected to diminish the influence of non-shareholder
stakeholders, as poor stock performance and shareholder returns increase the
likelihood that CEOs will not be re-elected to their positions.159
The second critique they identify is that because stakeholderism actually
expands the freedoms associated with corporate leaders’ decision-making
processes,160 directors and management would be further insulated from
stakeholder accountability because it (1) causes institutional investors to be
deferential to corporate leaders, less willing to support hedge fund activists,
and more willing to support shields to market pressures; and (2) induces
policymakers to support legal reforms that reduce accountability.161 This
would harm not only stakeholders but also shareholders via increased
managerial slack, worsened corporate performance, and reduced economic
efficiency and value creation.162
Their third critique is that the illusory promises of stakeholderism such
as those discussed above can be used to “deflect the demand for legal,
regulatory, and policy reforms.”163 If proponents of the New Paradigm

156. According to the authors, 56% of non-executive directors’ compensation packages are tied
to equity. Id. at 162.
157. Bebchuk & Tallarita do note three instances where CEO bonuses are linked to a
stakeholder metric, but that link is limited. Eastman links the annual bonus based on employee
safety, but specific weighting is not provided, so the compensation committee has broad discretion
in awarding the bonus. Marriott links their CEO’s bonus to the satisfaction of employees and guests
as measured by external surveys, but those are each given less than 2% of weight. Duke Energy
links their annual CEO bonus to environmental impact and customer satisfaction, but, as with
Marriott, those measures maintain a weight of 0.5% and 1.6% respectively. Id. at 150–51.
158. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (requiring shareholder vote on executive compensation (a.k.a.
“Say on Pay”)).
159. Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 141, at 145.
160. Id. at 165. Professor Bainbridge reaches a similar conclusion about the Business
Roundtable’s embrace of ESG. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Making Sense of the Business Roundtable’s
Reversal on Corporate Purpose 54 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Research Working
Paper No. 20–03, 2020) (“It seems reasonable to suspect that at least some BRT leaders look back
fondly on the days of imperial CEOs and see embracing ESG issues as a way of restoring that sort
of unfettered power.”).
161. Bebchuk, supra note 141, at 165 (“Recall that during the era of hostile stakeholders,
stakeholderism provided a basis for and facilitated the passage of antitakeover constituency statutes
that helped management fend off unwanted bidders.”).
162. See id. at 167 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves LongTerm Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1673–86 (2013)) (“[T]here is a substantial body of
empirical evidence that increased insulation and reduced accountability are associated with worse
managerial decisions and worse corporate performance.”).
163. Id. at 173.
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blindly place their faith in the stakeholder-centric governance structure, then
they may unintentionally thwart their entire movement for a more sustainable
corporate future.164
V.

Synthesis

The combination of the call for patient capital and stakeholderism move
public corporations down the path toward unaccountable corporate
management, and perhaps toward the era of managerialism—a culture that
unraveled in the face of rising global competition and scandals bred by a
marked lack of accountability. Moreover, we should question the motivations
for each of these proposed paradigmatic shifts. To be sure, the current era of
activist investors necessarily invites questions regarding long-term versus
short-term visions and related sustainability considerations. Moreover, as
discussed above, ESG is very much in the air as it is a dominant consideration
for a rising number of investors. But these explanations mesh poorly with the
details of The New Paradigm and certainly with the multiple anti-shareholder
legal developments discussed in Part III. Calls for corporate reform, such as
those described here—that quiet the shareholder voice and thus weaken
management accountability—naturally breed skepticism and more so in an
environment in which the rise of financial institutions is positioned to
complement the monitoring model.
VI. Recommendations and Conclusion
We conclude our article where it began with a nod to history; we see
current events seeking to complete history and believe we should allow that
to occur. The monitoring model was sensible when adopted, but the rise of
financial institutions and activist hedge funds was needed to complete the
model. Today’s markets are institutional markets and repeatedly institutions
have demonstrated their impact in supporting financial and social proposals
and strategies advanced by activist shareholders.
We therefore believe the path forward is to nurture, not impede, this
trend. Regulations and developments that retard the owners’ voice bear the
heavy burden of changing the well-received meaning of ownership. To that
end, efforts such as those described in Part III should be upheld only upon
convincing evidence that shareholder activism is harmful or more likely than
not is driven solely by pursuit of short-term objectives (accepting for the sake
of argument that short-term is less desirable than long-term objectives). The
empirical data summarized earlier reject the latter and the evidence is at best
(for the managerialist’s perspective) divided with respect to the latter. As
such, it is hardly a draw and in any case owners with substantial financial

164. Id.
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investments should be allowed to consider potential wealth-maximizing
proposals. And, the manner in which they so consider the proposals should
be transparent and of their choice. Hence, institutions who wholly or partially
rely on the recommendations of proxy solicitors should be able to do so,
albeit with disclosure of the process by which they consider proxy requests.
We also recommend that the rewards for activism be increased not reduced.
Thus, we oppose lowering the Section 13(d)(1) beneficial ownership below
5% and eliminating the 10-day window. Indeed, in addition to retaining the
10-day window, we would increase the ownership level to 10%—thereby
increasing the prospective gains for successful activist investors.

